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THE BUMPY ROAD OF TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIPS: 
UNDERSTANDING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTNERSHIP MAL-
FUNCTIONING 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Research on technological partnerships has traditionally sought explanation of their high 
failure rates in partner characteristics and relationship features. This study introduces the 
notion of  a ‘bumpy road’ in technology partnerships which refers to undesired outcomes 
such as ‘partnership mal-functioning’ and ‘instability’ to the degree to which innovation 
activities are hampered.  We explain how firm-level strategies can reduce the probability of a 
‘bumpy road’ in partnerships. We also assess the impact of this ‘bumpy road’ on innovative 
performance. We find that firms that excel in diversification of external activities (in terms of 
different types of partners) perform best. Moreover, a persistent product oriented innovation 
strategy geared at developing new products, new markets, or higher product quality will yield 
more stable partnership outcomes. Our results confirm that engagement in partnerships is 
beneficial for innovative performance. However, firms that experienced a ‘bumpy road’ in 
their technological partnerships have to pay a price in terms of a negative effect on their 
innovative performance.   
(160 words) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Failure is a frequent outcome of inter-firm partnering (Park and Ungson, 2001).  High failure 
rates of 30 percent to 50 percent in partnerships are not an uncommon finding in the literature 
(e.g., Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Harrigan, 1988; Killing, 1988). Especially technology 
partnerships, where firms exchange technology and jointly perform R&D in the context of 
complex intellectual property regimes, are inherently difficult to manage and hence this type 
of partnership is subject to the highest rates of failure (see e.g. Sadowski et al, 2005).  
Partnerships can be unsuccessful for various reasons. Prior research sought 
explanations for this phenomenon from the perspective of several theoretical approaches (see 
Das and Teng, 2000a for a literature overview). Transaction cost economics stresses the 
pursuit of self-interest at the expense of the partner as well as the high costs of deterring such 
opportunistic behavior as a major cause of partnership instability (Williamson, 1985; Gulati, 
1995). Game-theoretic approaches emphasize the role of uncertainty in predicting the 
intentions of partners and future payoffs (Parkhe, 1993a). The resource-based view suggests 
that inequality in resources that firms bring into a partnership gives rise to an eventual power 
imbalance between partners that can lead to a premature termination of their partnership 
(Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Das and Teng, 2000b; Osborn and Baughn, 1990). From the 
perspective of a strategic behavior approach, the literature points at the role of inter-firm 
rivalry and competition that increases the likelihood of partnership instability (Porter, 1985; 
1990; Kogut, 1989).   
The literature also indicates that partnerships are motivated by the need to share both 
risks and costs of R&D, to gain access to new technology and new markets, and to create 
synergetic effects (Hagedoorn, 1993). However, successful partnerships between competitors 
are expected to be rare because often achievement of these goals proves unrealistic, leading 
to a premature termination of a partnership (Porter, 1990). Partnerships with substantial 
overlap in core businesses, geographic markets, and functional skills are reported to have 
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success rates of about 30 percent as competitors are inclined to maximize their own 
individual objectives rather than their collaborative interests. Moreover, managerial 
complexity of these joint activities induces a higher probability of partnership failure (Park 
and Ungson, 2001). In a partnership, two or more independent firms need to be coordinated 
and also the activities of the partnership have to be aligned with the parent firms’ interests. 
This coordination may be cumbersome due to, for instance, cultural and organizational 
differences between partners turning partnership demise into a likely outcome (Parkhe, 
1993b).   
So far, the existing literature has seldom adhered to a uniform terminology when 
describing partnership outcomes. When assessing the positive performance of partnerships 
objective performance measures (e.g., sales growth, profitability, and return on assets) can be 
used or, alternatively, survey data can be employed where managers are asked directly to 
assess the performance of a partnership. For the assessment of less successful partnership 
outcomes, terms like ‘failure’, ‘premature termination’, ‘dissolution’ and ‘instability’ have 
been used interchangeably to indicate unfavorable results of a partnership (see Das and Teng, 
200a; Park and Ungson, 2001 for overviews). In our study we take a combination of these 
two approaches as we consider both the functioning and the results of technology 
partnerships.  
We employ a measure of firms experiencing a ‘bumpy road’ in their technology 
partnerships related to the notion of partnership instability as discussed by Das and Teng 
(2000a). We focus on firms that experienced a ‘bumpy road’ in their technology partnerships 
when unplanned outcomes such as stoppage, delay or abandonment of their joint innovation 
project(s) occurred.  A somewhat similar approach has been recently adopted in Lhuillery and 
Pfister (2009).  Our analysis deviates from their approach in a number of ways. First, we 
intentionally adopt a broader definition than simply premature partnership dissolution, by 
also analyzing those events when firms had difficulty-laden or even unproductive 
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partnerships. We do so to explore a broader issue of what factors and firm strategies can 
reduce the probability of things going wrong in partnerships. Cooperation that results in a 
failure is only one instance of this broader mal-functioning of partnerships.  Second, in the 
context of this broader perception of the mal-functioning of partnerships as their ‘bumpy 
road’, we investigate whether firms that employ a persistent innovation strategy geared at 
either reducing cost or developing new products face a lower probability of a such a ‘bumpy 
road’ in their technology partnerships.  Third, we consider whether there is an inverse 
relationship between the diversity and breadth in the partnership portfolio of firms and the 
probability of their partnership mal-functioning. Finally, in our analysis we look at the effect 
that the ‘bumpy road’ in the technological partnerships of firms might have on their future 
innovative performance. 
In the following, we study persistence in the overall firm’s business strategy with 
respect to firm’s innovative activities (product oriented vs. cost oriented) and in terms of 
firm’s alliance strategy. Our approach follows the definition of persistence as ‘state 
dependence’ (e.g. Heckman, 1981), which in our context means that firms are studied from 
the perspective of both their past innovation activities/partnerships and their current 
continuation of these activities. A similar approach has been used to analyze persistence in 
profits (Mueller, 1977; McGahan and Porter, 2003), innovation (Roberts, 1999; Raymond et 
al, 2010) or other measures of firm performance such as Tobin’s q (Villalonga, 2004). In 
these studies, persistence is also understood in terms of a relation between the ‘current state’ 
of a firm (in terms of its strategy or performance) and the ‘past states’ for the same dimension 
of its activities.  
To test our hypotheses we employ three consecutive streams of data for the period 
1994 – 2000 collected through the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS survey is 
organized by Eurostat and is aimed at collecting information on firms’ innovating activities. 
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The survey covers both large R&D performing firms as well as smaller innovating firms with 
a limited number of technology partnerships.   
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework and 
derives hypotheses. We then describe the data, variables and methods. This is followed by a 
presentation of the results, the final section discusses these results and it presents the 
conclusions. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Innovation strategy, partnership portfolio and a ‘bumpy road’ 
Innovation activities relate to different objectives, such as a cost-oriented process innovation 
objective or a demand enhancing product innovation objective, and the pursuit of these 
different innovation objectives requires distinct firm capabilities. Such capabilities are further 
developed by routinely executing related activities persistently over an extended period of 
time (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Firm capabilities that are gradually accumulated through the 
repeated execution of similar activities may become a source of a firm’s competitive 
advantage if these accumulated capabilities enable a firm to differentiate itself from its 
competitors (Barney, 1999; Diez-Vial, 2007; Hoetker, 2005). 
We also note that innovations in products are inherently more uncertain than 
innovations that are cost related (Boer and During, 2001; Freeman and Soete, 1997). When, 
as in our paper, innovations in products entail the replacement of obsolete products, 
improvement of product quality, expanding the product range and extending the product 
market range, they have an explorative character. Such product innovation projects are rife 
with uncertainty and often the direction of this explorative search is unclear. Also, a possible 
partner for joint activities may be hard to identify. This uncertainty may be countered with a 
persistent product innovation strategy. If such a strategy is conducted repeatedly over time 
the firm gets a better notion of its technological possibilities and a better understanding of the 
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future trends in consumer demands, which facilitates identification of future products and 
their attributes.  
In the context of this persistent product innovation strategy, the goal of partnerships 
may be set with both higher clarity and higher commitment and this may help the stability of 
the individual partnership. When objectives are unclear at the start of a partnership this may 
lead to various changes made while this partnership is still ongoing. This is detrimental to the 
functioning of a technology partnership as demonstrated by Sadowski et al. (2005) who 
report that changes in the priorities and the strategy of firms, related to technology 
partnerships, is the most frequently mentioned  reason for partnership termination (in nearly 
53% of all cases). Also, a more persistent product innovation strategy may be helpful in 
determining proper partnership candidates for future projects. A more persistent strategy may 
assist identifying which competences a firm lacks and hence hint at which partners may fill 
the gaps in specific resources. Again this may aid in clearly identifying the objectives of 
partnerships and contribute to a lower likelihood of a malfunctioning partnership.  
In sum, we expect that firms that persistently follow an innovation strategy, based on 
a product-focus, are less likely to encounter a bumpy road in their partnerships due to the 
accumulated and refined capabilities necessary for the execution of a strategy which leads to 
a lower probability of making mistakes in managing these partnerships. This suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Conducting a persistent innovation strategy, characterized by product focus, 
reduces the probability of a ‘bumpy road’ for a firm’s technology partnerships. 
 
When innovation has a cost focus the goal is to increase efficiency in production 
processes, to reduce the cost of labor and materials, the use of energy, and to comply with 
government regulations on product standards and reduction of environmental impact. The 
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nature of this type of process innovation is exploitative and in general the amount of 
uncertainty involved in exploitation is considerable but it is much less so than the uncertainty 
surrounding exploration. Still a persistent process innovation strategy based on cost focus 
may help in reducing the amount of uncertainty in terms of goal selection and partner choice, 
though the benefits are less than in the case of exploration. As a consequence we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Conducting a persistent innovation strategy, characterized by cost focus, 
reduces the probability of a ‘bumpy road’ for a firm’s technology partnerships but the effect 
is less than that of a persistent strategy based on product focus. 
 
In recent years, the literature on partnership performance not only considers the impact of the 
innovation strategy of firms but it has also taken a closer look at the role of firm’s 
‘partnership capabilities’ in fostering partnership performance (e.g., Heimeriks, 2008). A 
firm’s capability to transform its past collaboration experience into partnering routines is 
shown to significantly improve its future collaborative outcomes (Simonin, 1997). Such 
partnership capabilities and the accompanying collaborative know-how of a firm may, 
however, only gradually be built up by a firm through a deliberate learning process as it 
engages in multiple partnerships over time (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Firms that manage diverse partnership portfolios are expected to have developed 
superior coordination capabilities (Lavie and Miller, 2008) and therefore they are probably 
less prone to encounter a ‘bumpy road’. We propose that the diversity of a firm’s portfolio of 
partnerships is negatively related to a ‘bumpy road’. This portfolio diversity, on the one hand, 
refers to the variety of different partnership types (with different partners such as customers, 
suppliers, competitors, universities, research centers, consultants, and with other firms in the 
same parent company) and, on the other hand, it refers to the number of partnerships of each 
type in the portfolio.  
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In addition, firms that have gained experience in managing such diverse partnership 
portfolios are exposed to a learning effect by sourcing information from a variety of contacts 
(Burt, 1992; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Hilfat, 2005). Extant research has 
shown that learning takes place through managing larger numbers of alliances but also 
through collaborations with different types of partners (e.g., Reuer et al., 2002). The learning 
effect achieved through the establishment of a diverse partnership portfolio can increase the 
efficiency of partnering strategies (Faems et al., 2005) and reduce the probability of a mal-
functioning of partnerships. A broader range of collaborative links refines the organizational 
routines for cooperation and increases a firm’s experience in managing inter-firm 
relationships (Das and Teng, 2002; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).  
Moreover, the establishment of multiple partnerships can benefit a company by 
facilitating access to a broader pool of technological opportunities and knowledge acquisition 
options from multiple sources and by allowing the exploitation of synergetic effects between 
different partnership strategies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Belderbos et al., 2006). Previous 
research found that partnership portfolios of innovators are typically more diverse and 
internationally oriented compared to non-innovating and imitating firms (Duysters and 
Lokshin, 2007). Also, higher levels of portfolio diversity and internationalization improve the 
performance of firms (Lavie and Miller, 2008).  
In sum, we expect an inverse relationship between diversity of a firm’s partnership 
portfolio and the probability of partnership mal-functioning.  The above leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 3: The more diverse the partnership portfolio of a firm, the lower the likelihood 
of a ‘bumpy road’ for its technology partnerships. 
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The effect of a ‘bumpy road’ on innovative performance 
If we are to find that, under certain conditions, there is a higher likelihood of firms to face 
more or less of a ‘bumpy road’ with their technology partnerships, an interesting question 
that remains is: does it matter, do ‘bumpy roads’ in technology partnerships lead to lower 
innovative performance? In general, technology collaboration has been shown to be 
important for a firm’s innovation success (Hagedoorn, 1993; 2002; Un, Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Asakawa, 2008; Rowley et al., 2000; Song and di Benedetto, 2008). The knowledge-based 
perspective on partnerships posits that formation of technology partnerships is an essential 
mechanism that a firm uses to access knowledge it lacks (Spender and Grant, 1996; 
Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002; Spender, 2007). However, the process of gaining knowledge 
across firm’s boundaries is complex and prone with pitfalls (Kogut and Zander, 1992) and 
when this knowledge acquisition through partnerships strands, or when a ‘non-learning’ 
outcome occurs, this will contribute to the partnership demise (Doz, 1996).  
So, when partnerships are crucial to a firm, partnership mal-functioning will be 
harmful for its ability to bring innovations into the market. Partnership mal-functioning will 
have negative consequences for the innovation process of a firm as it will delay or complicate 
the acquisition of knowledge necessary for the continuation of a firm’s innovation cycle. 
Hence, a ‘bumpy road’ will have negative consequences for a firm’s innovative performance 
when a particular product, process or technology is delayed or is not altogether developed as 
a result of unsuccessful collaboration. The above arguments suggest that a ‘bumpy road’ in 
technological partnerships will have a negative impact on firm’s future innovative 
performance: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The experience of a ‘bumpy road’ in a firm’s technological partnerships is 
negatively related to its future innovative performance. 
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METHODS 
Sample and descriptive statistics 
The data for our study come from three consecutive Community Innovation Surveys (CIS2, 
CIS2.5 and CIS3). These bi-annual surveys were conducted in 1996, 1998 and 2000 by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and concern the innovation and partnership activities of Dutch 
firms in the period from 1994 to 2000. The data collection methodology and the 
questionnaires are described in the OECD Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997). The reliability of the 
CIS was tested by Eurostat which uses the surveys to collect official data on innovation 
activities of firms in the EU. The CIS surveys are sent to all large firms and to a random 
sample of firms with 10 or more employees and they cover all manufacturing and service 
sectors at the ISIC 3 level. The Dutch CIS have a response rate above 70%. We merged the 
surveys using the unique enterprise id number.  
The bi-annual CIS questionnaires are suitable to study the determinants of firms’ 
technology cooperative strategies since partnerships typically last about two years (e.g., Lavie 
and Miller, 2008), while an average R&D project duration has been estimated at one to two 
years (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Pakes and Schankerman, 1984).  
The CIS questionnaire has a multi-layer structure. Only those firms that report to be 
engaged in innovative activities (e.g. introducing new products, and/or new processes and/or 
organizational innovations) are asked to complete the entire questionnaire. In our analysis we 
focus on innovating firms only. The CIS question used to derive our focal partnership 
measure is formulated as follows: “Did your enterprise have any (if yes indicate the type of 
organization) partnership arrangements on innovation activities with some other enterprises 
or institutions in 1996-1998 (in case of CIS2 in 1994-1996)”. We also relied on the following 
survey question to measure whether those innovating firms that reported partnerships 
experienced a ‘bumpy road’ in their partnership arrangements: “Did your enterprise have any 
innovation projects that were a) seriously delayed b) were stopped c) did not begin in 1996 - 
 11
1998 due to difficulties in working together in partnerships [that you indicated to be engaged 
in]?” The parts a), b) and c) in this question are not exclusive and some firms in our sample 
ticked all three responses.  
The total survey sample of CIS 2 is 10664 firms from which 2291 firms are classified 
as product innovators and 1511 firms had one or more partnerships with one or more of the 
seven types of partners which include such types as customers, suppliers, competitors, 
universities, research centers, firms belonging to own concern, or consultants.  The total 
survey sample of CIS 2.5 is 13465 firms from which 2649 are product innovators and 1700 
firms had one or more partnership links. Partnerships with competitors, which has been the 
focus of much of the partnership literature, is not the most frequently adopted strategy (687 
firms). Cooperation with customers (903) and suppliers (942) are more frequently mentioned, 
as well as links within the own concern (840). Among the 1700 innovating firms that had at 
least one of these seven types of partnerships, 162 (10%) had their innovation projects 
stopped, delayed or not started. The total survey sample of CIS 3 is 10750 firms from which 
1777 introduced new to the market products and 1212 firms had one or more partnership 
links. 
Due to missing data on some of the variables we end up with an estimation sample of 
2839 firms for the merged surveys in our bumpy road model, 629 of which had one or more 
partnership links. Among these firms, 131 have reported to experience a ‘bumpy road’. 
Cooperation with competitors is most likely to end in a ‘bumpy road’ outcome, while this 
probability is lowest for the vertical type of cooperation with customers and suppliers (see 
Appendix A).  
Our analysis of how a ‘bumpy road’ affects innovative performance is based upon an 
estimation sample of 944 firms which includes firms with no partnerships. The ‘performance 
equation’ sample is somewhat smaller compared to the ‘bumpy road’ model sample because 
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we lose some observations when we link survey in year t (1998/1996) with the year t+1 
survey (2000/1998).  
Table 1 describes the way the variables we use in our study are constructed and it lists 
the descriptive statistics. Correlations between the variables used in the estimations of the 
‘bumpy road’ model and the performance model are given in Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2, 
accordingly. 
     
[TABLE 1 IS ABOUT HERE] 
 
To test our hypotheses we estimate two models: a model in which we explain the probability 
of a firm to experience a ‘bumpy road’ in its technological partnerships and an innovation 
performance model in which we test whether a ‘bumpy road’ has a subsequent impact on a 
firm’s innovative performance. Below we explain how we measure the variables used in the 
estimation.  
Dependent variables in the ‘bumpy road’ equation 
Our dependent variable in the ‘bumpy road’ equation is a binary (yes/no) indicator of a 
‘bumpy road’ experienced by a firm in technology partnerships during 1996 - 1998. In a 
recent study of partnership portfolios and firm performance Lavie and Miller (2008) report 
that an average duration of a technology partnership is 1.82 years. Cooperation viewed by 
partners as performing unsuccessfully can last much shorter (Porter, 1987). Our indicator of a 
‘bumpy road’ variable takes the value of one in case a firm reported that it had some kind of 
instability in its partnership agreements, as suggested by Das and Teng (2000a). In our 
dataset such partnership instability is reflected if innovation project(s) are stopped, seriously 
delayed or not started altogether due to mal-functioning of partnerships in which the firm was 
engaged. Arguably, only for those firms that indicated that (some of) their innovation projects 
were prematurely terminated, i.e. stopped, due to partnerships, there is an instance of 
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unambiguous partnership failure.  Other responses are less clear-cut. For example, a delay in 
projects could be experienced because of a more difficult nature of certain collaborative 
projects that are eventually brought to a successful end. In our main model we intentionally 
use a broader indicator than simply premature partnership dissolution by also including those 
firms that had less successful partnerships. As such we seek to explore a broader issue of 
what factors and firm strategies can reduce the probability of mal-functioning of partnerships. 
Cooperation that results in a failure is only one example of this mal-functioning.  
Only firms engaged in cooperation can experience partnership mal-functioning. 
Therefore, we have a sample selection issue in our model which we resolve by formulating a 
selection equation in which we model a firm’s decision to start technology collaboration. The 
dependent variable in our selection equation is also a binary indicator that takes a value one if 
a firm reports to be engaged in collaboration with one or more (types) of partners during the 
1996 - 1998 period. Both dependent variables in the equation for the propensity to engage in 
cooperation and in the equation for the probability of partnership mal-functioning are the 
measures taken from the CIS 2.5 (year t) survey. We estimate the (first-stage) selection and 
the main ‘bumpy road’ equations via a full maximum likelihood estimation procedure (e.g., 
Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981).  
Independent variables in the ‘bumpy road’ equation 
Persistence in innovation strategies. In our view, if firms develop a propensity for a 
particular type of activity, then such behavior should be called a persistent strategy. In this 
light, operationalization of “persistent strategy” can be achieved by multiplication of states. 
Suppose for instance that there are two firms. Firm I conducts a persistent strategy quantified 
by H in two consecutive years and firm II undertakes a persistent strategy labeled L in two 
consecutive years. Multiplication of states identifies firm I as a persistent H firm and firm II 
as a persistent L firm (H*H versus L*L). Taking the difference of the states would indicate 
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that both firms conduct a “no change” strategy (i.e H-H=0 and L-L=0). Hence we adopt the 
first method. 
To test the first two hypotheses we include two variables, derived from the CIS 
questions that ask firms about their innovation strategies. These measures reflect firm’s 
priorities in their innovation activities and relate either to product focus or cost focus. We 
make these variables operational using the information in CIS on the importance of demand-
enhancing and cost-saving objectives for a firm’s innovations. The variable product focus is 
constructed as a sum of scores on the importance of four categories of firm’s objectives, 
related to new products (replacement of obsolete products, improvement of product quality, 
expanding product range, extending product markets). The variable cost focus is constructed 
as the sum of scores on the importance of six categories of cost-saving objectives for the 
firm’s innovations (increase in efficiency in production processes; reduction of cost of labor; 
cost of materials; and reduction in the use of energy; compliance with the government 
regulations on product standards; reduction of environmental impact). We construct these 
variables for 1996 and 1998 and our persistency measure is a product of the corresponding 
1996 and 1998 variables.  
Partnership portfolio diversity. We consider a partnership portfolio that spans 
different partnerships types, which include industry partners (competitors) as well as non-
industry partners (customers, suppliers, universities, research centers, consultants and own 
concern allied firms). For each firm i  in our sample we calculate a simple measure
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 15
minimum value of zero (when a firm has zero partnerships with a particular type of partner) 
and a maximum value of five when a firm has partnerships in each of the five regions. The 
double sum in the denominator sums over all types of links. The ratio mir , gives the proportion 
of each link-type m out of the total number of link-types for each firm. Our measure of 
portfolio diversity is then expressed as ∑ =−= 7 1 2,1 m mii rd . This measure, which is bounded 
between zero and unity has been used in the literature to measure partnership portfolio 
diversity (e.g., Powell et al., 1996).  We construct the partnership portfolio diversity measure 
from the data for both surveys in 1996 and in 1998.  
Independent control variables in the ‘bumpy road’ equation 
Obviously, firms differ in many aspects, including their innovativeness. Given such 
differences, we expect that firms that establish themselves at the innovation frontier will 
enjoy a superior reputation vis-à-vis their rivals that are less successful innovators. Extant 
research suggests that a positive technological reputation of firms may help lessen the 
likelihood of frictions between partners and ensure a robust relationship and positive 
outcomes of a partnership (e.g., Saxton, 1997; Dollinger, Golden, Saxton, 1997). Following 
conventional practice we construct ‘R&D intensity’ as the total internal innovation 
expenditures as percentage of sales. By using the intensity measure rather than an absolute 
value, we counter scale effects.  
Firm strategies are more likely to result in successful outcomes if firms stick to certain 
routines that remain similar over an extended period of time (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Following a strategy that reflects a systematic trajectory of actions is more likely to bring 
success to firms because it involves decisions similar to those that managers have made in the 
past. Systematic strategies are more likely to succeed to the extent that they are anchored in 
organizational know-how and rest on a company’s employment of its core skills (Pennings, 
Barkema and Douma, 1994).  A firm that has a consistent structural preference for particular 
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partners has probably accumulated experience in dealing with these partners. By engaging in 
repeated ties with the same kind of partner a firm will learn to fine-tune its reactions to 
similar problems it encountered with similar partners or partners of the same type (e.g., Kale, 
Dyer, and Singh 2002).  Furthermore, a systematic trajectory of repeated ties with the same 
type of partner may be different from non-systematic strategies in that the former may have 
such features as trust, reciprocity and superior information exchange between partners and 
hence will lead to a lower probability of a ‘bumpy road’.   
To summarize, firms that have a consistent structural preference for one type of 
partner are less likely to encounter a bumpy road in partnerships due to first-hand experience 
in dealing with a particular type of partner and because of the reduced probability of 
opportunistic behavior (Gulati, 1995). We operationalize ‘persistence in partnering 
strategies’ as follows. By combining the 1994-1996 and 1996-1998 surveys we are able to 
construct a ‘persistent-same-type’ technology collaborator measure. A ‘persistent-same-type’ 
collaborator is a firm that had partnerships with a respective vertical (customers, suppliers or 
both) or horizontal (firms in the same industry) type of partner in both two-year time periods.  
Previous literature identified various environmental conditions as a possible cause for 
partnership instability (e.g., Kogut, 1989; Park and Russo, 1996; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Following the discussion in e.g., Howells (2002) we created an ‘infrastructure’ dummy 
taking the value of one, indicating the presence of partnerships with research centers and 
consultants to account for firm’s cooperative activities with non-industry partners, and zero 
otherwise.  
We also  included controls for inter-industry variation taking account of, for example, 
differences in riskiness of innovation projects by including aggregated ‘industry dummies’. 
We distinguish between high tech, medium tech, low-medium tech and low tech industries. 
We used an OECD classification to assign ISIC-3 industries into these four classes.  
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The intensity of competition within an industry could be a source of a higher rate of 
partnership mal-functioning (Park and Ungson, 2001; Das and Teng, 2000). We control for 
this by including a ‘competition index’ variable, which is constructed at the 2-digit industry 
level as a sum of scores on six dimensions corresponding to Porter’s taxonomy of 
competitive forces (perceived internal rivalry, supplier and customer power, perceived threat 
of entry and substitute products and institutional influence). Each of the dimensions is 
measured through a series of questions in a structured questionnaire administered by EIM (an 
institute that conducts business and policy research in the Netherlands). Reliability of the 
dimensions and the questionnaire are given by Kemp, Mosselman, and van Witteloostuijn 
(2004).  
Researchers usually control for variations in industry conditions by including industry 
dummies in the regressions. Because we cannot use the competition variable simultaneously 
with the industry dummies due to perfect multicollinearity, we estimate two specifications, 
one with the competition index and one with the industry dummies without the index.  
Finally, we control for ‘firm size’, which is measured as the logarithm of the number 
of employees. We expect a negative relation between size and ‘bumpy road’.  Previous 
literature argues that larger firms are less vulnerable to exploitation in collaborative 
arrangements that endangers the partnership stability than smaller firms (e.g. Osborn and 
Baughn, 1990; Park and Ungson, 1997). 
Explanatory variables in the propensity to cooperate equation 
We draw on the industrial organization and strategic management literatures to specify our 
selection equation which explains firms’ propensity to engage in technology partnering. 
Previous contributions argue that incoming spillovers, i.e. voluntary exchange of knowledge 
in cooperative arrangements, generally increase a firm’s incentives to collaborate (e.g., 
Abramovsky et al., 2008; Belderbos et al., 2004). In our model we include a measure (taken 
in period t-1) of the importance of information received from industry partners (customers, 
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suppliers, competitors) for a firm’s innovative activities to control for source-specific 
incoming knowledge transfers. Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) we also include a 
similar measure constructed as a sum of scores on the importance of information obtained 
from patents, conferences, and publications for a firm’s innovative process to control for 
public information sourcing. In addition, we add R&D intensity as a measure of absorptive 
capacity that allows a firm to effectively capture incoming knowledge flows (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989).  
Recent work on technology partnering suggests that firms can attempt to manage 
knowledge transfers by exploiting incoming knowledge spillovers through partnerships and at 
the same time limit the information outflows (e.g., Amir et al., 2003; Cassiman et al., 2002). 
Availability and effectiveness of means to protect innovations has been found to be a positive 
determinant of a firms’ decision to form external collaborative agreements (Ahuja, 2000; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). To partly control for this effect, we include a dummy 
variable which takes the value one if a firm has patents, else zero.  
Prior empirical research suggests that firm size and the propensity to form 
partnerships are correlated (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2006; Harrigan, 1988). Larger firms have 
more abundant resources and may find it easier to manage multiple technology partnerships. 
We include firm size measured as the logarithm of the number of employees in the propensity 
to form partnerships equation. We also control for whether a firm is domestic or 
multinational and for whether it is part of a larger corporate group by including 
corresponding dummy variables.  
Finally, informed by the previous literature on the motives behind technology 
partnerships (Hagedoorn, 1993; 2002; Das and Teng, 1998) we include three firm-specific 
measures related to cost and risk of innovation as well as organizational rigidities that capture 
factors that hamper a firm’s innovation process, potentially inducing it to seek partnerships.  
See also table 1 for more details on these variables. 
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Dependent variable in the innovative performance equation 
In order to test the fourth hypothesis pertaining to the effect of the ‘bumpy road’ on a firm’s 
performance we estimate a model in which the dependent variable is the share of new product 
sales in turnover. These new products were new to the market and were introduced by a firm 
in the period 1+t  (i.e. in 1998 to 2000). Product novelty can be defined on the basis of the 
technological significance of the invention or its market relevance (Trajtenberg, 1990). CIS 
uses the latter approach. We pass this variable through a logistic transformation prior to the 
estimation.  
 
Explanatory variables in the innovative performance equation 
The explanatory variables in the performance equation are the occurrence of a ‘bumpy road’, 
presence of technology partnerships, R&D intensity, firm size, a dummy controlling for 
whether a firm is part of a domestic group or foreign multinational (cf. Belderbos et al., 
2004). We also included the variable public incoming spillovers (cf. Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2002).  
A vector X contains industry dummies indicating whether a firm operates in a high 
tech, medium tech, low-medium tech or low tech industry and firm location dummies (at the 
province level). As argued in the above, we expect a negative impact of a ‘bumpy road’ on a 
firm’s innovative performance. We further expect a positive impact of technological 
partnering on performance and a positive impact of R&D input on innovative performance.  
The ‘bumpy road’ variable in the performance equation is potentially endogenous 
because, for instance, unobserved managerial qualities may affect both the occurrence of a 
bumpy road and the innovative performance of a firm. Therefore, instead of the actual values, 
we use the fitted (predicted) values of ‘bumpy road’, iYˆ  which we obtain after the maximum 
likelihood estimation of equations (1) and (2) (see below).  
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Modeling approach 
In order to analyze the determinants of a ‘bumpy road’ we jointly estimate the firm’s decision 
to engage in partnerships and the probability that a ‘bumpy road’ will occur when such 
partnerships are formed. Only those firms that are engaged in cooperation can experience 
partnership mal-functioning. Therefore, we have a sample selection issue in our model. To 
take this into account we estimate a Heckman probit model with selection. The main equation 
in our model describes the probability that one (or more) of a firm’s partnerships will mal-
function. The selection equation explains the decision of a firm to engage in cooperation. 
Both equations are estimated simultaneously via a maximum likelihood estimation method.  
The equations are given by: 
+++++= −1,4321 __ tiiiii DivDivfocusCostfocusProdY ββββα  
iiiiii
iiii
XCompUnivInfraSize
mixCoophorCoopvertCoopRdint
εκββββ
ββββ
++++++
+++++
1211109
8765 ___
    (1) 
 
For an explanation of these variable names we refer to Table 1. We observe in (1) only a 
binary outcome: 
otherwise. zero is and ,0 if  1 >= ii YBumpyroad  
The latent variable iY , partnership mal-functioning, is not always observed. The dependent 
variable for firm i is observed if cooperation takes place (selection equation) which is the 
case if in our model: 
++++++= iiiiii DomfirmRdintSizePubinfSpilaZ 54321( ϕϕϕϕϕ  
0),
10
876
>+++++ ∑ = iiinn nii uXHampPatentDomgroup ζφϕϕ     (2) 
Hence, the dependent variable in the selection equation indicating the occurrence of 
cooperation is 
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Cooperationi = 1 if Zi > 0, and is zero otherwise.  
Both error terms in equations (1) and (2), iε and iu , are assumed to be normally distributed 
and are correlated, with correlation parameter 0≠ρ . 
To test whether a ‘bumpy road’ has an impact on a firm’s innovative performance, we 
can augment the system of equations (1) and (2) with the following performance equation:  
+++++++= iiiiiii MNEDomgroupSizeRdintnCooperatioYaNewSales 543321 ˆ ζζζζζζ     
 iii XSpil υψζ +++ 6          (3) 
The dependent variable in our innovative performance equation is the share of new products 
in turnover which were new to the market and introduced by a firm in the period 1+t  (i.e. in 
1998 to 2000).  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the results from the selection equation (2), which explains firms’ propensity 
to engage in technology partnerships. Firms are more likely to engage in technology 
partnering when they expect large incoming knowledge flows from the industry partners ( 1ϕ
= 0.05, p<0.01). On the other hand, information from the public sources has little effect on 
such a propensity. Larger firms are more likely to engage in cooperation ( 3ϕ = 0.20, p<0.01), 
confirming earlier results that found that the size of companies is a significant predictor to 
form partnerships due to more abundant resources of larger firms (Cohen and Klepper, 1996; 
Harrigan, 1988). More R&D intensive firms are also more likely to form partnerships ( 4ϕ = 
0.01, p<0.01). Firms’ R&D spending increases their absorptive capacity and ability to 
assimilate external knowledge from partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery and 
Oxley, 1995).  Firms that experience bottlenecks caused by financial risk in their R&D 
projects and uncertain markets are more likely to seek external partners ( 10ϕ = 0.09, p<0.01). 
However, the coefficients for the variables that measure other types of constraints such as 
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lack of financial resources and organization rigidities are, although positive, not significant at 
the conventional levels. Our patent variable, which we used as a proxy for IPR protection, is 
also positive and significant ( 7ϕ = 0.26, p<0.01), confirming earlier findings that the 
effectiveness of means to protect innovations from imitators has a positive influence on firms 
decision to engage in partnerships (Ahuja, 2000).  
[TABLE 2 IS ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 3 IS ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 reports the results from the ‘bumpy road’ equation (1). Firms that persistently 
pursue a product-oriented innovation strategy are less likely to encounter a ‘bumpy road’. 
The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant ( 1β = -0.02, p<0.01), supporting 
Hypothesis 1.1 We find the coefficient on the variable indicating whether firms conduct a 
persistent cost focus innovation strategy to be insignificant. This result rejects hypothesis 2. 
However, it is in line with our expectation that the effect of this variable should be less 
pronounced than that of the persistent product innovation strategy. Apparently persistency of 
a cost oriented innovation strategy is not required to counter uncertainty along this 
dimension. The results also indicate that increasing technology partnership diversity has a 
                                                 
1 Jointly pursuing a product and cost oriented strategy may affect the chance of a ‘bumpy 
road’ as well. We have tried a number of interaction terms to account for this. For instance, 
we have added a dummy equal to one if a firm scores high (above average) on the Likert 
scale for the objectives relating to both product and cost focus, else zero. The sign of such a 
variable is positive as expected but not significant and its inclusion does not affect our other 
findings.   
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negative impact on the probability of experiencing a ‘bumpy road.’2 The coefficient on the 
partnership diversity measure taken in 1996 (t-1) period is ( 4β = -0.41, p<0.01), supporting 
Hypothesis 3. 3 We note that the coefficient on a con-current diversity variable is not 
significant.4  
For the control variables, we observe that the probability of a ‘bumpy road’ is lower 
for innovative firms. The coefficient on the R&D intensity measure is negative and 
statistically significant ( 5β = -0.04, p<0.01). Pursuing a consistent strategy in technology 
collaboration by forming partnerships with the same type of partners can help reduce the 
                                                 
2 To test for non-linear effects of diversity we included diversity (t) squared and diversity (t-
1) squared. These variables are not significant at the conventional levels.   
3 We also experimented with a different diversity variable, constructed as before but now 
using knowledge sources (that firms report to be important in their innovation activities) 
instead of actual partnerships.  When constructing this alternative diversity measure we 
experimented by using only industry partners (customer, supplier, competitor) in constructing 
it, alternatively using only those responses that are rated ‘important’ or ‘very important’. This 
variable has a negative coefficient, as expected, but not significantly different from zero at 
any conventional level. It did not affect other results in the model. This would suggest that 
diversity in experience of actual partnerships, not simply in sourcing knowledge, is necessary 
to reduce the probability of a ‘bumpy road’. 
4 We note that identification of the parameter measuring the effect of this variable is not 
hampered by multicollinearity. The coefficient of correlation between the diversity variables 
in 1996 and 1998 is only about 0.2. Furthermore, if we drop the 1996 diversity variable form 
the model, then the 1998 variable remains insignificant.  
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probability of a ‘bumpy road.’5 The coefficients on our persistent partnerships variables are 
all negative, however only the vertical type is statistically significant ( 6β = -0.26, p<0.01).6  
Among the other control variables, firm size and a measure of competition intensity are 
statistically significant. The probability of a ‘bumpy road’ decreases with firm size.7 This last 
result is in line with studies that argued that smaller firms are more vulnerable to exploitation 
in partnerships endangering their stability (e.g., Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Park and Ungson, 
1997). In the specification where we include an industry competition index, this variable is 
                                                 
5 We also estimated the model in which we include variables indicating the presence of 
vertical, horizontal or mixed ties in 1996 together with the variable accounting for the 
persistence of such relationships. When both variables are present in the model none of the 
variables accounting for these relationships are significant due to identification problems 
caused by multicollinearity.  If we do not include the variables accounting for persistent ties 
then only the variable accounting for a vertical tie in 1996 becomes negative and significant. 
However, it is estimated much less precisely than the variable accounting for persistent 
vertical ties and hence our preferred model includes the persistency variables. 
6  We also tested the differentiated impact between customer and supplier variables by 
separately estimating coefficients on ‘persistent customer collaboration’ and ‘persistent 
supplier collaboration’, which were both negative (-0.12 and -0.25, accordingly), as expected, 
however only ‘persistent supplier collaboration’ is significant (p=0.02). These results suggest 
that especially conducting strategy of persistently allying with suppliers can lead to reduced 
probabilities of experiencing a ‘bumpy road’.  
7 A large firm might be able to manage more efficiently its partnership portfolio. We tested 
this formally by including additional interaction terms between the firm size and our diversity 
measure. Neither of the two interaction terms turns out to be statistically significant. In fact, 
the fit of the model has declined when the interaction terms are included.  
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positive and significant ( 12β = 0.06, p<0.01). This suggests that an increase in competition 
could lead to a higher probability of partnership failure (cf. Park and Ungson, 2001).8  
Table 4 reports the results from the performance equation (3). These results confirm 
Hypothesis 4. We find a negative and significant impact of the ‘bumpy road’ on a firm’s 
innovative performance (coefficient 01 <ζ , p<0.05). This result suggests that those firms that 
experience a ‘bumpy road’ in their technology partnerships will introduce fewer new 
products to the market. On the other hand, we find a positive impact of technology partnering 
on performance (coefficient 02 >ζ , p<0.01), suggesting that firms that form partnerships 
outperform those firms that do not. Among the control variables, we find a positive impact of 
R&D input on innovative performance ( 03 >ζ , p<0.1), while the variable firm size is not 
statistically significant.9  
                                                 
8 Our statistical model describes the probability of experiencing a ‘bumpy road’  and is equal 
to one minus the probability of no ‘bumpy road’, which equals one minus the probability of 
no ‘bumpy road’ for a single partnership in the power n, where n is the number of partners. In 
short, the probability of experiencing a ‘bumpy road’ is a function of n, the number of 
partnership links. Observing a ‘bumpy road’ with one of the partners is then more likely with 
a higher number of partnerships. We have also estimated the model including a variable 
measuring the number of different partnership types to control for the possibility that a simple 
increase in the number of links can raise the probability that things go wrong in one of them. 
To control for this we included a simple count of the types of partnerships which takes values 
from zero to seven. This variable was found to be insignificant in all specifications, inclusion 
did not affect our other conclusions and therefore we deleted it from our preferred model to 
conserve degrees of freedom. 
9 We also checked whether our results in the innovation performance equation change if we 
treat the decision to engage in partnerships as endogenous. We re-estimated equation (3) but 
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[TABLE 4 IS ABOUT HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Technology partnerships are inherently difficult to manage and as a result partnership 
instability rates are notoriously high. Our empirical results indicate that it is costly to 
encounter serious problems in technology partnerships. We find that for partnering firms 
going through a ‘bumpy road’ i.e. when badly performing technology partnerships induce 
unplanned outcomes as stoppage, delay or abandonment of innovation projects, the 
innovative performance is reduced substantially. In particular, in terms of generating new 
sales through new products experiencing a mal-functioning of technology partnerships is very 
costly. As a consequence, we think that firms have an incentive to counter such problems 
effectively.  
Our results indicate that firms may pursue several strategies to reduce the likelihood 
of a ‘bumpy road’ in their partnerships. First, we find that firms that persistently rely on a 
product focus innovation strategy through developing new products, new markets and 
improving product quality face better chances in dealing with a ‘bumpy road.’ A strategy 
based on the exploration of these new opportunities, where firms persistently engage in joint 
innovation projects, rather than jointly exploiting cost efficiencies, lowers the probability of 
inter-organizational mal-functioning. As discussed in the above, persistent product and 
market innovators, are more successful in avoiding partnership problems because they face 
less uncertainty regarding both the goals of an alliance and the appropriate partnership 
                                                                                                                                                        
instead of the actual cooperation variable, we used the predicted values from equation (2). 
The results are similar to those we report in Table 4. The coefficient on ‘bumpy road’ 
variable becomes somewhat smaller, but is still significant at the conventional levels. 
 27
candidate. In addition, firms with an innovative reputation, are desirable partners for 
technology partnerships (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999) and this reputation limits the 
potential frictions in technology partnerships. This result for the effect of a persistent 
innovation strategy, as a signal of consistency to partners, also indicates that it is important to 
avoid changing the firm’s priorities in order to prevent partnership malfunctioning. 
Second, we find that generating a diverse portfolio of partnerships may be helpful in 
obtaining the required experience in dealing with partners. Our results corroborate existing 
field research that has pointed out that firm’s first-hand experience with partnerships and 
firm’s ability to learn from its experience helps it avoid pitfalls in future partnerships 
(Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009; Kale et al., 2002). In particular, our results indicate that firms 
with links to a diverse group of other firms are confronted with a much lower incidence of 
problematic partnership outcomes. This relevance of the diversity of partnerships can be 
linked to attempts of firms to avoid the pitfalls of local search constraints (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). A diversity of partnerships gives access to a range of tacit skills, many of 
which are related to the technological capabilities and knowledge sources of these partners 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Lim, 2004). Firms that operate in a context of diverse contacts are 
more likely to benefit from an exposure to different ideas, varied experiences and a range of 
events through which they develop a more elaborate knowledge base on how to successfully 
manage their technology partnerships. Our findings suggest it is necessary to distinguish 
between the benefits of a current diverse portfolio and a diverse portfolio established in the 
past. We find that the current management of a diverse portfolio does not affect the 
probability of experiencing partnership malfunctioning. The learning experience materializes 
when a diverse portfolio was established some time ago. If some time has elapsed since the 
experience of a diverse partnership portfolio, capabilities can be generated that are 
instrumental for the effectiveness of future technology partnerships. However, these learning 
advantages have not yet materialized when the current portfolio of partnerships is very 
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diverse. In particular, one may expect that if the current portfolio consists of a wide variety of 
different types of partnerships the management of this portfolio becomes more troublesome 
which may increase the probability of a `bumpy road.’  
Third, the more firms are able to avoid ‘bumpy roads’ the higher their future 
innovative performance. As also established by Spender (2007) and Zahra and George 
(2002), firms with a higher diversity in their partnerships portfolio gradually develop skills 
that enable them to improve their ability to absorb valuable information from outside sources 
which we interpret as an ability to avoid mal-functioning in their partnership formation. The 
better organized the portfolio of partnerships, in the sense of avoiding troublesome 
partnerships, the better firms are at leveraging their newly acquired skills into new innovative 
activities that improve their innovative performance. 
Interestingly, these results for the technology partnering behavior of firms resonate 
the findings of a classical study on the difference between successful and unsuccessful 
innovators (Rothwell, Freeman, Horsley, Jervis, Robertson, and Townsend, 1974). Similar to 
our findings on the ‘bumpy road’ of technology partnerships and their role in the innovation 
performance of firms, Rothwell et al. (1974) found, amongst other things, that firms with a 
persistent innovation strategy and a more extensive use of outside resources were more 
successful innovators than firms that scored lower on these characteristics. In the current 
world, where innovation is much more embedded in inter-firm technology partnerships, our 
findings illustrate that a diversity of outside technological resources through a seasoned and 
diverse portfolio of partnerships, in the context of a product focused innovation strategy, is 
crucial if firms attempt to minimize the effects of malfunctioning technology partnerships.  
Limitations and future research 
 
CIS follows a long tradition of Yale and SPRU innovation surveys by collecting a large 
amount of primary information on firms’ innovative strategies. The advantage of CIS 
compared to other surveys is that it is a large-scale survey that does the sampling and data 
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collection in a rather rigorous way (in many countries it is administered by the national 
statistical bureaus) and that it covers in a representative way most of the ISIC 3 sectors and 
firms of different size classes. While offering researchers interesting insights into firm’s 
innovation process, a large-scale database like CIS has a number of limitations. First, it puts a 
constraint on the researcher in terms of the measures that can be used. Some fine-grained 
information, for instance, about firms’ capabilities and the process that firms go through 
while organizing their partnerships, is not available. As pointed out earlier, one limitation of 
our framework is that we have no information on the relative importance of firms’ individual 
collaborations within their portfolio of partnerships. Information on the number of ties of 
each type is also not available. Second, although CIS is conducted on a bi-annual basis, some 
questions do not belong to the ‘core questionnaire’ and thus are rotated or deleted from one 
survey to another. In our study we worked with some questions that are rotated. While it did 
not hamper our ability to trace firms across a number of years, it did put limitations to our 
ability to construct a proper panel and control for firm-specific effects.  
In this paper we documented the benefits of persistent innovation strategies for 
alliance outcomes. Such persistency (as state dependence) can be due to various reasons such 
as resource needs, governance preferences, inertia and habit, path-dependency or the 
‘remediableness criterion’ as discussed by Willamson (1996). A proper investigation of why 
persistence in a firm’s innovation strategies arises in the first place is beyond the scope of this 
paper and is left for further research. Another interesting avenue for future research is a 
further investigation of the bi-directional link between firm’s partnership capabilities and the 
performance of its technological partnerships. Initial exploratory research shows that some 
capabilities are more important than others and that firms can enhance partnership 
performance through development of particular partnership capabilities, which may act as a 
mediator between partnership experience and partnership performance (Zollo and Winter, 
2002; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007).  A somewhat related avenue is the (mediating) effect 
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of organizational competencies and specific managerial practices on firm’s partnership 
performance. In our framework we highlighted the benefits of pursuing certain firm-level 
innovation strategies to reduce the probability of partnership-malfunctioning, yet a better 
understanding of the interplay between organizational and strategic aspects may be needed. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and construction of variables   
 
 Variable name Definition Mean S.D. 
1 Bumpy road 
(Bumpyroad) 
1 if a firm experienced mal-functioning in R&D 
technology partnerships which lead to one or more 
innovation projects stopped, seriously delayed or not 
started; else 0 
0.05 0.21 
2 Consistent product 
focus 
(Prod_focus) 
Product of the sum of scores for 1996 and 1998 on the 
importance of four categories of innovation objectives, 
relating to new products and markets and products 
quality.  
12.15 11.13 
3 Consistent cost focus 
(Cost_focus) 
Product of the sum of scores for 1996 and 1998 on the 
importance of six categories of objectives, including 
efficiency in production processes, labor, materials and 
the use of energy. 
29.97 37.21 
4 Partnership portfolio 
diversity 
(Div) 
Blau’s index of heterogeneity, see description in text 0.89 0.25 
5 R&D intensity 
(Rdint) 
Total internal innovation expenditures as a share of sales 0.04 1.26 
6 Consistent vertical 
cooperation 
(Coop_vert) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in technology 
partnerships with customers and/or suppliers but not 
competitors both in 1996 and 1998; else 0 
0.04 0.21 
7 Consistent horizontal 
cooperation 
(Coop_hor) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in technology 
partnerships with competitors but not customers and 
suppliers both in 1996 and 1998; else 0 
0.01 0.06 
8 Consistent mixed 
cooperation 
(Coop_mix) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in technology 
partnerships with customers and/or suppliers and 
competitors both in 1996 and 1998; else 0 
0.01 0.11 
9 Cooperation 
(Cooperation) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in technology 
partnerships, else 0 
0.22 0.42 
10 Firm size 
(Size) 
Logarithm of number of employees 4.37 1.18 
11 Infrastructure 
(Infra) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in cooperation with 
consultants and/or TNO, else 0  
0.11 0.32 
12 University 
cooperation 
(Univ) 
1 if a firm reported engagement in cooperation with 
universities; else 0 
0.07 0.26 
13 Competition index 
(Comp) 
constructed at the 2-digit industry level as a sum of 
scores on six dimensions corresponding to  Porter’s 
taxonomy 
46.7 2.91 
14 Incoming knowledge 
flows from industry & 
non-industry partners 
(Spil) 
Sum of scores of importance of information received 
from customers, suppliers, competitors for firm’s 
innovative activities 
6.03 3.75 
15 Incoming knowledge 
flows from public 
sources 
(Pubspil) 
Sum of scores of importance of information received 
from patents, conferences, and publications competitors 
for firm’s innovative activities 
2.85 2.21 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
16 Organizational 
constraints related to 
organization rigidities 
(Hamp8) 
Sum of scores on the following responses: 
Innovation project did not start, was abandoned or 
delayed due to short of qualified staff; due to short of 
knowledge; rigid organization 
0.55 1.04 
17 Organizational 
constraints related to 
costs 
(Hamp9) 
Sum of scores on the following responses: 
Innovation project did not start was abandoned or 
delayed due to short of financing; due to high costs 
0.32 0.69 
18 Organizational 
constraints related to 
risk 
(Hamp10) 
Sum of scores on the following responses: 
Innovation project did not start, was abandoned or 
delayed due to economic risks; due to uncertain markets 
0.46 0.86 
19 Domestic firm 
(Domfirm) 
1 if the headquarters of the firm are located in the 
Netherlands, else 0 
0.75 0.43 
20 Part of a group 
(Domgroup) 
1 if a firm is a part of a domestic corporate group, else 0 0.74 0.44 
21 Patent 
(Patent) 
1 if a firm reports to have patents, else 0 0.17 0.37 
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Table 2 Probit model (selection equation) for the technology cooperation decision 
 
Dependent variable:  
Cooperation 
First-stage model for 
Model 1  
First-stage model for 
Model 2 
Spil 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Pubspil 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Size 0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
Rdint 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
Domfirm 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Domgroup 0.10 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
Patent 0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
Hamp8 0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Hamp9 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Hamp10 0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Industry dummies Included Included 
N firms 2839 2839 
Censored observations 2210 2210 
Uncensored observations 629 629 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. 
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Table 3 Probit model for partnership mal-functioning 
 
Dependent variable: Bumpy roadt Second-stage model 
 Model 1 
(with industry 
competition variable) 
Model 2 
(with industry 
dummies) 
Prod_focus  -0.01***  
(0.00) 
 -0.02***  
(0.00) 
Cost_focus -0.00  
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
Div 0.13  
(0.14) 
0.16  
(0.16) 
Divt-1 -0.41***  
(0.14) 
-0.41***  
(0.14) 
Rdint -0.03***  
(0.01) 
-0.04***  
(0.01) 
Coop_vert -0.26***  
(0.09) 
-0.26**  
(0.11) 
Coop_hor -0.11  
(0.25) 
-0.10  
(0.26) 
Coop_mix -0.08  
(0.16) 
-0.06  
(0.17) 
Firm size -0.16***  
(0.04) 
 -0.14***  
(0.05)  
Infra  0.16  
(0.13) 
 0.18  
(0.15) 
Univ  0.01  
(0.14) 
 0.03  
(0.17) 
Comp  0.07***  
(0.02) 
 
Industry dummies  Included 
Correlation between equations (ρ) -0.87  
(0.07) 
-0.82  
(0.11) 
Wald test of independent equations 
(p-value) 
14.97 
(0.00) 
 
N-firms 629 629 
Log likelihood -1536.62 -1543.85 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. 
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Table 4 Innovative performance effects of ‘bumpy road’ 
 
Dependent variable: Newsalest+1  Performance 
model 
Yˆ  -1.41** 
(0.71) 
Cooperation  0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Rdint 1.14 
(1.30) 
Size 0.08 
(0.08) 
Pubspil 0.06** 
(0.03) 
Foreign MNE 0.17 
(0.23) 
Domgroup -0.06 
(0.21) 
Industry dummies Included 
Location dummies Included 
R2 0.13 
N firms 944 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. 
All independent variables are for 1998 except for the industry and location dummies. 
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Appendix A Propensity for cooperation and failure rates by type of partner 
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Table B1, Correlations ‘bumpy road’ model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 1.00                     
2 0.13 1.00                    
3 0.12 0.54 1.00                   
4 -0.07 -0.25 0.14 1.00                  
5 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.17 1.00                 
6 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 1.00                
7 0.03 0.17 0.10 -0.29 -0.25 -0.00 1.00               
8 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.13 -0.10 -0.00 -0.01 1.00              
9 0.05 0.12 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 1.00             
10 0.05 0.19 0.21 -0.11 -0.12 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.15 1.00            
11 0.09 0.16 0.18 -0.10 -0.21 -0.00 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.24 1.00           
12 0.07 0.16 0.14 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.29 0.22 0.59 1.00          
13 -0.01 -0.20 -0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 1.00         
14 0.13 0.28 0.24 -0.36 -0.15 0.01 0.27 0.05 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.30 -0.07 1.00        
15 0.08 0.34 0.33 -0.11 -0.13 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.31 0.29 -0.06 0.22 1.00       
16 0.09 0.27 0.28 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.20 -0.09 0.13 0.56 1.00      
17 0.05 0.17 0.09 -0.08 -0.12 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.17 -0.08 0.15 0.20 0.15 1.00     
18 0.12 0.14 0.11 -0.06 -0.09 0.03 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.18 -0.10 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.43 1.00    
19 0.13 0.21 0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.18 -0.11 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.46 0.62 1.00   
20 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 1.00  
21 0.03 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.13 1.00 
22 0.08 0.29 0.19 -0.11 -0.12 -0.00 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.18 0.18 -0.10 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.22 -0.15 0.10 
(1) ‘Bumpy road’, (2) Consistent product focus, (3) Consistent cost focus, (4) Portfolio diversity year t, (5) Portfolio diversity year (t-1), (6) 
R&D intensity, (7) Consistent vertical, (8) Consistent horizontal, (9) Consistent mixed, (10) Firm size, (11) Infrastructure, (12) University 
cooperation, (13) Competition index, (14) Cooperation, (15) Incoming knowledge flows industry & non-industry, (16) Incoming knowledge 
flows public, (17) Organizational constraints, (18) Cost constraints, (19) Risk constraints, (20) Domestic firm, (21) Part of a group, (22) 
Patent. 
 
Table B2, Correlations innovation performance model 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1.00       
2 -0.22 1.00      
3 0.14 -0.48 1.00     
4 0.21 -0.26 0.31 1.00    
5 0.12 -0.22 0.09 0.16 1.00   
6 0.08 -0.15 0.16 0.04 0.02 1.00  
7 0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.70 1.00 
8 0.15 -0.23 0.20 0.29 0.11 -0.06 0.01 
(1) New sales, (2) Bumpy road (fitted), (3) Firm size, (4) Cooperation, (5) R&D intensity, 
(6) Foreign MNE, (7) Domestic group, (8) Incoming spillovers 
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